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Thursday, February 7, 2013

U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues



K. Alan Kronstadt
Specialist in South Asian Affairs

Sonia Pinto
Research Associate


In today’s fluid geopolitical environment, the relationship between the United States, the world’s oldest democracy and an established global power, and India, its most populous democracy and an aspiring global power, is seen as a key variable in the unfolding international dynamics of the 21st century. As U.S. foreign policy attention shifts toward the Asia-Pacific (or Indo-Pacific) region, and as India’s economic and military capabilities grow, Washington’s pursuit of a strategic partnership with New Delhi demonstrates that the mutual wariness of the Cold War era has rapidly faded. A vital and in some ways leading aspect of this partnership has been security relations, and today the two countries are engaging in unprecedented levels of military-to-military ties, defense trade, and counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation. Still, although considerable enthusiasm for deepened security engagement is found in both capitals—and not least in the U.S. Congress—there is also a persistent sense that this aspect of the bilateral relationship lacks purpose and focus. Some observers arrgue that the potential of the relationship has been oversold, and that the benefits either hoped for or expected may not materialize in the near future. While Obama Administration officials variously contend that India is now or will be a net provider of security in its region, many independent analysts are skeptical that this aspiration can be realized, at least in the near-term.

Nongovernmental analyses of the course and pace of U.S.-India security relations are oftentimes incompatible or even conflicting in their assumptions and recommendations. Such incompatibility is frequently the result of the differing conclusions rooted in short-term versus long-term perspectives. The Obama Administration—along with numerous pro-India analysts in Washington—has tended to emphasize the anticipated benefits of long-term engagement as opposed to a short-term approach that seeks gains derived through more narrow transactions. This latter tack can have the effect of raising and then thwarting expectations in Washington, as was the case with the ultimate failure of U.S. defense firms to secure the multi-billion-dollar contracts to supply new combat aircraft to India. At the same time, frustrations among many in the United States have arisen from the sense that India’s enthusiasm for further deepening bilateral security cooperation is limited, and that New Delhi’s reciprocity has been insufficient.

Looking ahead, there is widespread concurrence among many officials and analysts that the security relationship would benefit from undergirding ambitious rhetoric with more concrete action in areas of mutual agreement. In their view, defining which actions will provide meaningful gains, even on a modest scale, appears to be the central task facing U.S. and Indian policy makers in coming years.

To assist Members of Congress and their staffs in clarifying the status of and outlook for bilateral security cooperation, this report—a companion to CRS Report R42823, India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement, by K. Alan Kronstadt and Sonia Pinto—takes a systematic approach to the major strategic perspectives held by policy makers in both countries and the ways in which these perspectives are variously harmonious, discordant, or, in some cases, both. The report opens with a brief review of the pre-2005 history of U.S.-India security relations. This is followed by discussion of key U.S. security interests related to India. Next is a focus on India’s defense posture writ large. With this context set, the report reviews key areas of convergent and divergent security interests and perspectives. A brief discussion of the outlook for future security cooperation closes. For information on U.S.-India relations more broadly, see CRS Report RL33529, India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations , coordinated by K. Alan Kronstadt.



Date of Report: January 24, 2013
Number of Pages: 56
Order Number: R42948
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U.S. Sanctions on Burma: Issues for the 113th Congress



Michael F. Martin
Specialist Asian Affairs

Since December 2011, the Obama Administration has waived many of the existing sanctions specifically imposed on Burma in an effort to promote greater political and economic reform in the country. Having waived most of the sanctions for which he had the authority to do so, President Obama may approach the 113th Congress about the selective repeal or removal of one or more of the current sanctions on Burma. In addition, the 113th Congress may consider either the imposition of additional sanctions or the removal of some of the existing sanctions on Burma, depending on the conduct of the Burmese government and other developments in the country.

Existing U.S. sanctions on Burma are based on various U.S. laws and presidential executive orders. This report provides a brief history of U.S. policy towards Burma and the development of U.S. sanctions, a topical summary of those sanctions, and an overview of actions taken to waive or ease those sanctions by the Obama Administration. The report concludes with a discussion of actions taken by the 112
th Congress and options for 113th Congress.

Current U.S. sanctions on Burma can be generally divided into several broad categories, such as visa bans, restrictions on financial services, prohibitions of Burmese imported goods, a ban on new investments in Burma, and constraints on U.S. assistance to Burma.

The current U.S. sanctions on Burma were enacted, for the most part, due to what the U.S. government saw as a general disregard by Burma’s ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), for the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Burma. Burma-specific sanctions began following the Burmese military’s violent suppression of popular protests in 1988, and have continued through several subsequent periods in which Congress perceived major human rights violations in Burma. The result is a web of overlapping sanctions with differing restrictions, waiver provisions, expiration conditions, and reporting requirements.

In addition to the targeted sanctions, Burma is currently subject to certain sanctions specified in U.S. laws addressing various functional issues. In many cases, the type of assistance or relations restricted or prohibited by these provisions is also addressed under Burma-specific sanction laws. The functional issues include the use of child soldiers, drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, failure to protect religious freedoms, violations of workers’ rights, and threats to world peace and the security of the United States.

On March 30, 2011, the SPDC formally dissolved itself and transferred power to a nominally civilian government known as the Union Government, headed by President Thein Sein, exgeneral and former prime minister for the SPDC. President Thein Sein, with the support of Burma’s Union Parliament, has implemented a number of political and economic reforms, to which the Obama Administration has responded by waiving or easing sanctions. However, the continuation of serious human rights abuses has raised questions about the extent to which there has been significant political change in Burma, and if the easing of sanctions has been warranted.



Date of Report: January 11, 2013
Number of Pages: 44
Order Number: R42939
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Monday, January 28, 2013

Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations


Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs

Since the mid-1990s, tensions have spiked periodically among Japan, China, and Taiwan over the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) islets in the East China Sea. These flare-ups run the risk of involving the United States in an armed conflict in the region. Japan administers the eight small, uninhabited islets, which some geologists believe sit near significant oil and natural gas deposits. China and Taiwan both contest Japanese claims of sovereignty over the islets.

U.S. administrations going back at least to the Nixon Administration have stated that the United States takes no position on the territorial disputes. However, it also has been U.S. policy since 1972 that the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the islets, because Article 5 of the treaty stipulates that the United States is bound to protect “the territories under the Administration of Japan” and Japan administers the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands). Under the treaty, the United States guarantees Japan’s security in return for the right to station U.S. troops—which currently number around 50,000—in dozens of bases throughout the Japanese archipelago. Although it is commonly understood that Japan will assume the primary responsibility for the defense of the treaty area, in the event of a significant armed conflict with either China or Taiwan, most Japanese would likely expect that the United States would honor its treaty obligations.

Each time tensions over the islets have flared, questions have arisen concerning the U.S. legal relationship to the islets. This report will focus on that issue, which has four elements:

  1. U.S. administration of the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands) from 1953 to 1971; 
  2. the application to the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands) of the 1971 “Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands”—commonly known as the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, approved by the Senate in 1971 and entered into force the following year (the Daito Islands lie to the east of Okinawa); 
  3. the U.S. view on the claims of the disputants; and 
  4. the relationship of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to the islets. 
Members of Congress periodically have been involved or expressed interest in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) dispute over the decades, most prominently when the issue of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty’s application arose during the Senate’s deliberations over the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. In 2012, Congressional committees explored the topic in hearings and inserted in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310) a resolution stating, among other items, that “the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the United States’ acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands.” This language was a reaction to China’s increase in patrols around the Senkakus since the fall of 2012, moves that appear to many to be an attempt to exploit the U.S. distinction between sovereignty and administrative control by demonstrating that Beijing has a degree of administrative control over the islets.


Date of Report: January 10, 2013
Number of Pages:
10
Order Number: R42761

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Tuesday, January 15, 2013

U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues



Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs

Wayne M. Morrison
Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance


The purpose and scope of this CRS report is to provide a succinct overview with analysis of the issues in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. This report will be updated as warranted. Taiwan formally calls itself the sovereign Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC set up after the revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC government retreated to Taipei in 1949. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained a non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing in 1979. The State Department claims an “unofficial” U.S. relationship with Taiwan, despite official contacts that include arms sales. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. Other key statements that guide policy are the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982; as well as the “Six Assurances” of 1982. (See also CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.)

For decades, Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and political interest to the United States. In 2011, Taiwan was the 10
th-largest U.S. trading partner and the 6th-largest market for U.S. agricultural exports. Taiwan is a major innovator of information technology (IT) products. Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect international security (with potential U.S. intervention), the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and U.S.-PRC cooperation. While the United States does not diplomatically recognize Taiwan, it is a significant autonomous actor in the world. Today, 23 countries including the Vatican have diplomatic relations with Taiwan as the ROC. Taiwan’s 23 million people enjoy self-governance with free elections. After Taiwan’s presidential election in 2008, the United States congratulated Taiwan as a “beacon of democracy.” Taiwan’s democracy has allowed its people a greater say in their status, given competing party politics about Taiwan’s national political identity and priorities. Taiwan held presidential and legislative elections on January 14, 2012. Kuomintang (KMT) President Ma Ying-jeou won re-election against the candidate from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

Since Taiwan and the PRC resumed their quasi-official dialogue in 2008 under President Ma and cross-strait tension decreased, some have stressed concerns about steps seen as needed to be taken by the United States and by Taiwan to strengthen their relationship. Another approach has viewed closer cross-strait engagement as allowing U.S. attention to shift to expand cooperation with a rising China, which opposes U.S. arms sales and other dealings with Taiwan. In any case, Washington and Taipei have put more efforts into their respective relations with Beijing, while contending that they have pursued a positive, parallel U.S.-Taiwan relationship.

Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou has sought U.S. support for his policies, including Taiwan’s entry in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and proposed talks on maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. Other policy issues include whether to approve arms sales, restart Cabinet-level visits, and resume trade talks under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), or TIFA talks. The United States has cited concerns about Taiwan’s restrictions on U.S. beef, even as Taiwan seeks support in international organizations.

Legislation in the 112
th Congress include H.Con.Res. 39, H.Con.Res. 77, H.Con.Res. 122, H.R. 2583, H.R. 2918, H.R. 2992, H.R. 4310, H.R. 5902, H.R. 6313, H.Res. 352, H.Res. 616, S. 1539, S. 1545, S.Con.Res. 17, S.Res. 542, S. 3254, H.Res. 814, and H.R. 6649. Other congressional actions have focused on arms sales, particularly the issue of whether to sell F-16C/D fighters. (See CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.)


Date of Report: January 4, 2013
Number of Pages: 33
Order Number: R41952
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