Thomas Lum
Coordinator, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Rhoda Margesson
Coordinator, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
This report examines the impact of Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), which struck
the central Philippines on November 8, 2013, and the U.S. and
international response. Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) was one of the strongest
typhoons (cyclones) to strike land on record. Over a 16 hour period, the
“super typhoon,” with a force equivalent to a Category 5 hurricane and
sustained winds of up to 195 mph, directly swept through six provinces and
affected over 10% of the nation’s population of 105 million people. The
areas damaged by the typhoon were some of the poorest parts of the
Philippines.
Congressional concerns related to the storm and its aftermath include the
immediate U.S. and international humanitarian response, the impact on the
U.S. foreign aid budget, the long-term U.S. foreign aid strategy for the
Philippines, and how the U.S. response to the disaster may impact the
U.S.-Philippines relationship as well as regional geopolitical dynamics.
The disaster quickly created a humanitarian crisis. In some of the hardest hit
areas, particularly in coastal communities in Leyte province and the
southern tip of Eastern Samar, the storm knocked out power,
telecommunications, and water supplies. Between 65% and 90% of structures were heavily
damaged or destroyed. Two weeks after the typhoon, the Philippine government
reported that an estimated 13.7 million people had been affected, with
more than 3.43 million displaced (of which roughly 240,800 were housed in
1,096 evacuation centers). The government also reported that 792,000
people were evacuated in advance of the disaster. On November 25, an estimated 5,000
deaths were associated with the typhoon and more than 1,600 people were thought
to be missing. All these numbers remain fluid and subject to revision.
The ongoing humanitarian relief operation is being led by the Philippine
government. The United Nations, along with other partners, including the
United States, is supporting the current on-theground response for
humanitarian assistance. Apart from U.N. agencies, those responding to the crisis
include international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
Private Voluntary Agencies (PVOs), and bilateral and multilateral donors.
On November 12, 2013, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs appealed for $301 million in the Haiyan Action Plan to provide
life-saving assistance and early recovery support. On November 22, the Plan
increased to $348 million, based on assessments completed as partners gained
better access to affected areas. As of November 22, U.S. funding for the
humanitarian response included nearly $52 million to support activities
through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and
Department of Defense (DOD) humanitarian relief operations.
At its peak, approximately 50 U.S. military ships and aircraft were involved in
relief efforts and nearly 1,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed
directly to disaster areas. The USS George Washington naval task
force as well as elements of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) from Okinawa formed the majority of
Joint Task Force (JTF) 505, which coordinated and carried out U.S.
military relief efforts (Operation Damayan).
U.S. military assistance included transporting aid workers, clearing
roads, distributing relief supplies, and evacuating those affected by the
typhoon. On November 24, 2013, DOD officials announced it would begin to
transition all of its relief efforts to the Philippine government.
The involvement of U.S. military forces in Haiyan relief efforts has come at a
time of growing U.S.-Philippine security cooperation. The United States
and the Philippines maintain close ties stemming from the U.S. colonial
period (1898-1946), a security alliance, and common strategic and economic
interests. Other pillars of the bilateral bond include shared democratic values
and extensive people-to-people contacts. U.S. military forces engage in
regular joint exercises with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The
United States also has an ongoing, limited, nonpermanent military presence
in the country engaged in counterterrorism and humanitarian activities.
This report will be updated as events warrant. For background and information
on the Philippines, see CRS Report RL33233, The
Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests.
For background on how the U.S. responds to international disasters, see
CRS Report RL33769, International
Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Response Mechanisms.
Date of Report: November 25, 2013
Number of Pages: 30
Order Number: R43309
Price: $29.95
To Order:
R43309 .pdf
to use the SECURE SHOPPING CART
e-mail congress@pennyhill.com
Phone
301-253-0881
For email and phone orders, provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card
number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail
or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing
Shirley Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
This CRS report, updated as warranted, discusses policy issues regarding
military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993.
The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed
sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In
1993, the Clinton Administration reengaged with the top PRC leadership,
including China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed
military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in
the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union
included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall
bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in
1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis,
mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP- 3 aircraft
collision crisis in 2001, and aggressive maritime confrontations (including in
2009).
Issues for Congress include whether the Administration complies with
legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursues contacts with the
PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially
the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight legislation
includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L.
101-246) and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L.
106-65). A particular issue is whether the President is required to issue
waivers of sanctions. Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with
the PRC have debated whether the contacts achieve results in U.S. objectives
and whether the contacts contribute to the PLA’s warfighting capability that
might harm U.S. and allied security interests. Some have argued about
whether the value that U.S. officials place on the contacts overly extends
leverage to the PLA. Some believe talks can serve U.S. interests that
include conflict avoidance/crisis management; military-civilian coordination; transparency
and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; talks
on nuclear, missile, space, and/or cyber domains; counterterrorism; and
POW/MIA accounting.
Policymakers could review the approach to mil-to-mil contacts, given concerns about
potential crises and conflicts. U.S. officials have faced challenges in
gaining cooperation from the PLA. The PLA has tried to use its suspensions
of exchanges while blaming U.S.-only “obstacles” (including arms sales to
Taiwan, FY2000 NDAA, and air and naval reconnaissance operations).
The PRC’s harassment of U.S. surveillance ships (in 2009) and increasing
assertiveness in maritime disputes showed some limits to mil-to-mil talks
and PLA restraint. Still, at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED)
in July 2009, President Obama called for military contacts to diminish
disputes with Beijing. The U.S. articulations in 2011-2012 of a strategic
“rebalancing” to Asia (or “pivot” to the Pacific) raised an issue of how
to deal with China’s challenges. The Administration’s “rebalance” entails
not only an expansion of engagement with the PLA, but also increasing
exercises. The Defense Secretary visited in September 2012 and invited the PLA
Navy to participate for the first time in the U.S.-led maritime exercise,
RIMPAC 2014. The PLA Navy’s potential participation at RIMPAC near Hawaii
has raised concerns in Congress and elsewhere. The U.S. Navy has started
to increase some “interoperability” with the PLA Navy.
In 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013, the Obama Administration was late in submitting
an annual required report on security developments involving the PRC,
cooperation, and mil-to-mil contacts. Legislation in the 113th Congress includes the
FY2014 NDAA (H.R. 1960 and S. 1197), FY2014 Defense
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2397), and FY2014 Department of State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs Appropriations (S. 1372).
Date of Report: November 20, 2013
Number of Pages: 83
Order Number: RL32496
Price: $29.95
To Order:
RL32496 .pdf
to use the SECURE SHOPPING CART
e-mail congress@pennyhill.com
Phone
301-253-0881
For email and phone orders, provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card
number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail
or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processin
Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces
on the westernmost U.S. territory of Guam to increase U.S. operational
presence, deterrence, and power projection for potential responses to
crises and disasters, counterterrorism, and contingencies in support of South
Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. Since 2006, joint
exercises based at Guam called “Valiant Shield” have boosted U.S. military
readiness in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate.
China has concerns about Guam’s buildup, suspecting it to be directed
against China. There has been concern that China and North Korea could
target Guam with missiles. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has
increased activities in waters around Guam. Still, Guam’s role increased
in engaging with the PLA.
In 2006, the United States and Japan agreed on a Realignment Roadmap to
strengthen their alliance, including a buildup on Guam to cost $10.3
billion, with Japan contributing 60%. Goals were to start the related
construction on Guam by 2010 and to complete relocation of about
8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. In Tokyo on February 17, 2009,
the Secretary of State signed a U.S.-Japan agreement on the relocation of
the III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel from Okinawa to Guam that
reaffirmed the “Roadmap” of May 1, 2006. However, the marines’ relocation
will not occur by 2014. The original realignment actually would have involved
more than moving 8,000 marines to Guam. Japan’s dispute over the location
on Okinawa of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) to replace the Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma raised implications for the relocation of
marines from Okinawa to Guam. Nonetheless, despite the dispute over the
FRF, Japan has budgeted for its contributions to the marines’ relocation to
Guam.
By 2011, some Members urged attention to concerns that included Japan’s
impasse, expanded costs, and the delay in the realignment even as a strong
U.S. military presence and readiness remain critical in Asian-Pacific
region. On May 11, 2011, Senators Carl Levin, John McCain, and Jim Webb
called for a review of plans to restructure military forces in South Korea,
Japan, and Guam, in order to make progress. President Obama issued in
January 2012 the defense guidance for the strategy of “rebalancing”
diplomatic, defense, and economic priorities more to the Asia- Pacific.
This “rebalance” further raised Guam’s profile as a “strategic hub.” Finally,
on February 8, the United States and Japan agreed to “adjust” the Roadmap
and separate the move of marines from the plan for the FRF, in order to
make progress separately. A U.S.-Japan Joint Statement of April 2012
specified that out of about 9,000 marines to be relocated from Okinawa, about
5,000 marines would move to Guam. Out of the new estimated cost of $8.6
billion, Japan would contribute $3.1 billion. A U.S.-Japan Joint Statement
of October 2013 pointed to a later relocation of marines to Guam that will
begin in the first half of the 2020s.
Facing North Korea’s announced missile threats against Guam in March 2013, the
Defense Department announced on April 3 that it would deploy to Guam
within weeks a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic
missile defense system as a precautionary measure to improve defenses
against North Korea’s missile threat. After China’s military announced an
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea on November
23, the U.S. Air Force flew two B-52 bombers from Guam into the ADIZ in
defiance of China’s rules for notification.
Legislation includes the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2014, H.R.
1960 and S. 1197. For further discussion, see the section on
legislation. Updated as warranted, this CRS Report discusses major
developments and policy issues related to the defense buildup.
Date of Report: November 27, 2013
Number of Pages: 29
Order Number: RS22570
Price: $29.95
To Order:
RS22570 .pdf
to use the SECURE SHOPPING CART
e-mail congress@pennyhill.com
Phone
301-253-0881
For email and phone orders, provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card
number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail
or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processin
Posts
