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Wednesday, September 25, 2013

Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments



Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs

Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the westernmost U.S. territory of Guam to increase U.S. operational presence, deterrence, and power projection for potential responses to crises and disasters, counterterrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. Since 2006, joint exercises based at Guam called “Valiant Shield” have boosted U.S. military readiness in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. China has concerns about Guam’s buildup, suspecting it to be directed against China. There has been concern that China and North Korea could target Guam with missiles. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has increased activities in waters around Guam. Still, Guam’s role increased in engaging with the PLA.

In 2006, the United States and Japan agreed on a Realignment Roadmap to strengthen their alliance, including a buildup on Guam to cost $10.3 billion, with Japan contributing 60%. Goals were to start the related construction on Guam by 2010 and to complete relocation of about 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. In Tokyo on February 17, 2009, the Secretary of State signed the bilateral “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam” that reaffirmed the “Roadmap” of May 1, 2006.

However, completion of the marines’ relocation by 2014 would be unlikely, and the original realignment actually would have involved more than moving 8,000 marines to Guam. Japan’s dispute over the location on Okinawa of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) to replace the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma raised implications for the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam. Nonetheless, despite the dispute over the FRF, Japan has budgeted for its contributions to the marines’ relocation to Guam.

By 2011, some Members urged attention to concerns that included Japan’s impasse, expanded costs, and the delay in the realignment even as the U.S. military presence and readiness remain critical. On May 11, 2011, Senators Carl Levin, John McCain, and Jim Webb called for a review of plans to restructure military forces in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. President Obama issued in January 2012 the defense guidance for the strategy of “rebalancing” diplomatic, defense, and economic priorities more to the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, on February 8, the United States and Japan agreed to “adjust” the Roadmap and separate the move of marines from the plan for the FRF, in order to make progress separately. A U.S.-Japan Joint Statement of April 2012 specified that out of about 9,000 marines to be relocated from Okinawa, about 5,000 marines would move to Guam. Out of the new estimated cost of $8.6 billion, Japan would contribute $3.1 billion. In March 2013, the Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM) testified to Congress that he estimated the completion of movement of marines to Guam by 2020.

Facing North Korea’s announced missile threats against Guam in March 2013, the Defense Department announced on April 3 that it would deploy to Guam within weeks a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system as a precautionary measure to improve defenses against North Korea’s missile threat.

Legislation includes the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2014, H.R. 1960 and S. 1197. For further discussion, see the section on legislation. Updated as warranted, this CRS Report discusses major developments and policy issues related to the defense buildup.


Date of Report: September 12, 2013
Number of Pages: 28
Order Number: RS22570
Price: $29.95

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Monday, September 23, 2013

Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations



Bruce Vaughn
Specialist in Asian Affaris

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, an island nation in the Indian Ocean, is a constitutional democracy with a relatively high level of development. For two and a half decades, political, social, and economic development was seriously constrained by years of ethnic conflict and war between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers. After a violent end to the civil war in May 2009, in which authorities crushed LTTE forces and precipitated a humanitarian emergency in Sri Lanka’s Tamil-dominated north, attention has turned to whether the government now has the ability and intention to build a stable peace in Sri Lanka.

This report provides historical, political, and economic background on Sri Lanka and examines U.S.-Sri Lanka relations and policy concerns. In recent years interest in Sri Lanka has focused on human rights issues related to the final stages of Sri Lanka’s 26-year civil war with the LTTE, and its attendant humanitarian emergency. Sri Lanka has faced criticism for what has been viewed as an insufficient response to reported war crimes, a more nepotistic and ethnically biased government, as well as increasing restrictions on media and an unequal distribution of economic development.

Between 1983 and 2009, a separatist war costing at least 70,000 lives was waged against government forces by the LTTE, a rebel group that sought to establish a separate state or internal self-rule in the Tamil-dominated areas of the north and east. The United States designated the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997.

Sri Lanka offers a test case of how to respond to a brutal military victory over a violent ethnonationalist separatist movement. The situation presents decision-makers questions of how to balance the imperatives of seeking accountability and resolution, providing development assistance, and promoting broad geopolitical interests. President Mahinda Rajapaksa has a firm hold on government and popular support among the Sinhalese majority for his leadership in presiding over a military victory over the LTTE. But Sri Lanka remains a multi-ethnic society, where long-held historic grievances have been deepened still further by the conflict’s brutal end.

Although Sri Lanka maintains strong economic ties with countries in its close geographic proximity, Sri Lanka-India relations have been strained due to political and ethnic tensions (Sri Lanka’s minority Tamils have strong linkages with Tamil communities in India), and there has been an increase in military and energy related investments from China in recent years. Sri Lanka remains the only South Asian nation with a high human development index ranking.

The United States recognizes the importance of the nation with its significant geographic positioning, and has paid close attention to human rights in the island nation. The U.S.-Sri Lanka relationship has been focused on human rights issues over the last few years, with an emphasis on U.S. sponsorship of resolutions through the United Nations Human Rights Council.


Date of Report: September 4, 2013
Number of Pages: 17
Order Number: RL31707
Price: $29.95

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China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei



Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs

Despite broadly consistent statements, the U.S. “one China” policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the “one China” policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. In Part I, this CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the “one China” policy since U.S. presidents began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing. Part II records the evolution of policy as affected by legislation and key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), celebrating in 2011 the 100th anniversary of its founding. Policy covers three major issue areas: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan; and crossstrait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained a non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC in 1979. The State Department claims an “unofficial” relationship. The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States “acknowledged” the “one China” position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Since 1971, U.S. Presidents—both secretly and publicly—have articulated a “one China” policy in understandings with the PRC. Congressional oversight has watched for any new agreements and any shift in the U.S. stance closer to that of Beijing’s “one China” principle—on questions of sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue. Not recognizing the PRC’s claim over Taiwan or Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan’s status as unsettled. With added conditions, U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the strait: a “peaceful resolution” with the assent of Taiwan’s people and without unilateral changes. In short, U.S. policy focuses on the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome.

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. The TRA stipulates the expectation that the future of Taiwan “will be determined” by peaceful means. The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy, among the stipulations: to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future “a threat” to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of “grave concern” to the United States; “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” jeopardizing the security, or social or economic system of Taiwan’s people. The TRA provides a congressional role in determining security assistance “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” President Reagan also offered “Six Assurances” to Taipei in 1982, partly covering arms sales. The State Department reaffirmed the Six Assurances at a congressional hearing in October 2011.

Policymakers have continued to face unresolved issues, while the political and strategic context of the policy has changed dramatically since the 1970s. Since the early 1990s, U.S. interests in the military balance as well as peace and security in the Taiwan Strait have been challenged by the PRC’s military buildup (particularly in missiles) and coercion, moves perceived by Beijing for Taiwan’s de jure independence under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s president (2000- 2008), and resistance in Taiwan by the Kuomintang (KMT) party to raising defense spending. After the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou became President in May 2008, Taipei and Beijing resumed the cross-strait dialogue—beyond seeking detente. With President Obama since 2009, a rhetorical convergence emerged among the three sides about “peaceful development” of cross-strait engagement. However, disagreements remain about Taiwan’s status and U.S. arms sales.


Date of Report: September 6, 2013
Number of Pages: 89
Order Number: RL30341
Price: $29.95

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