Susan V. Lawrence
Specialist in Asian Affairs
This report provides a snapshot of China’s leading political institutions
and current leaders in the form of nine organization charts and three
tables. The report is a companion to CRS Report R41007, Understanding
China’s Political System, by Susan V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin, which
provides a detailed explanation of China’s political system. This chart-based
report is intended to assist Members and their staffs seeking to
understand where political institutions and individuals fit within the
broader Chinese political system and to identify which Chinese officials are
responsible for specific portfolios. The information may be useful for Members
and staff visiting China, hosting visitors from China, preparing for
China-related hearings, or drafting China-related legislation.
Figures 1 and 2 depict China’s political power structure as it was envisioned
in Chapter 3 of the 1982 state constitution, and as actually implemented.
The key difference is that while Chapter 3 of the state constitution
identifies the National People’s Congress as the highest organ of state power,
the Communist Party of China exercises leadership over the entire political
system.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 provide information about the Communist Party’s leadership.
Figure 3 presents the Party’s hierarchy. Figure 4 lists the members of the
Party’s most senior decisionmaking body, the Politburo Standing Committee,
and their portfolios. Figure 5 lists all 25 members of the full Politburo
and their principal areas of responsibility.
Figure 6 lists the members of the Central Military Commission, a Party body
that exercises unified command over the armed forces, known collectively
as the People’s Liberation Army.
Figure 7 shows where the largely honorary office of the State President sits
within the state hierarchy, according to the state constitution. The
president’s authority actually derives from his concurrent post as General
Secretary of the Communist Party.
Figure 8 presents the hierarchy of the State Council, a cabinet-like entity
which is tasked with implementing Party policies and managing the state
bureaucracy. China conducts its relations with most of the world through
the State Council. Table 1 introduces the 10 members of the State Council
Executive Committee, listed by rank, with information about each official’s
portfolio. Figure 9 depicts the organizational structure of China’s
unicameral legislature, the National People’s Congress.
Table 2 lists leading Party, military, and State officials with portfolios that
include foreign affairs. Table 3 lists the top officials of China’s
Foreign Ministry, with information about each official’s portfolio.
Date of Report: November 12, 2013
Number of Pages: 30
Order Number: R43303
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Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
Wayne M. Morrison
Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
The purpose and scope of this CRS report is to provide a succinct overview
with analysis of the major issues in the U.S. policy on Taiwan. This
report will be updated as warranted. Taiwan formally calls itself the
sovereign Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to
the ROC set up after the revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC government
retreated to Taipei in 1949. The United States recognized the ROC until
the end of 1978 and has maintained a nondiplomatic relationship with
Taiwan after recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
in Beijing in 1979. The State Department claims an “unofficial” U.S.
relationship with Taiwan, despite official contacts that include arms sales.
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed policy in
the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. Other key
statements that guide policy are the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972,
1979, and 1982; as well as the “Six Assurances” of 1982. (See also CRS
Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution
of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.)
For decades, Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and political
interest to the United States. In 2012, Taiwan was the 11th-largest U.S. trading
partner. Taiwan is a major innovator and producer of information
technology (IT) products, many of which are assembled in the PRC by
Taiwan-invested firms there. Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait
affect international security (with potential U.S. intervention), the
U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and U.S.- PRC cooperation. While the United
States does not diplomatically recognize Taiwan, it is in reality an
important autonomous actor. Today, 23 countries (including the Vatican) have diplomatic
relations with Taiwan as the ROC. Taiwan’s 23 million people enjoy
self-governance with democratic elections. After Taiwan’s presidential
election in 2008, the United States congratulated Taiwan as a “beacon of
democracy.” Democracy has offered Taiwan’s people a greater say in their
status, given competing politics about Taiwan’s national identity and
priorities. Taiwan held presidential and legislative elections in January
2012. Kuomintang (KMT) President Ma Ying-jeou won re-election against the
Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) candidate.
Since Taiwan and the PRC resumed their quasi-official dialogue in 2008 under
President Ma and cross-strait tension decreased, some have stressed the
need to take steps by the United States and by Taiwan to strengthen their
relationship to advance U.S. interests. Another approach has viewed closer
cross-strait engagement as allowing U.S. attention to shift to expand
cooperation with a rising China, which opposes U.S. arms sales and other
dealings with Taiwan. In any case, Washington and Taipei have put more
efforts into their respective relations with Beijing, while contending
that they have pursued a positive, parallel U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou has sought U.S. support for his policies,
including Taiwan’s inclusion in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) (in
2012), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and talks on
maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. Other policy issues
include whether to approve arms sales, whether to restart U.S. Cabinet-level
visits, and how to bolster trade relations and resolve disputes, such as
through the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) talks (resumed
in March 2013). The United States has been especially concerned about
Taiwan’s restrictions on U.S. beef and pork, even as Taiwan has claimed
attention to international organizations and standards. Since March 2013,
Chairmen Ed Royce and Robert Menendez of the House Foreign Affairs and
Senate Foreign Relations Committees, and other Members, have supported a
bilateral investment agreement (BIA). Legislation in the 113th Congress includes H.R. 419,
H.R. 772, H.R. 1151 (P.L. 113-17), H.R. 1960, H.Con.Res. 29, H.Con.Res.
46, H.Con.Res. 55, H.Res. 185, S. 12, S. 579, S. 1197, and S.Res. 167.
Other congressional actions have focused on arms sales. (See CRS Report
RL30957, Taiwan:
Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.)
Date of Report: November 12, 2013
Number of Pages: 48
Order Number: R41952
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Michael F. Martin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
The installation of a new quasi-civilian government in 2011 and the
undertaking of a number of political reforms have raised the prospects for
the resumption of a fully democratically elected civilian government in
Burma after five decades of military rule. The release of Burma’s political prisoners
has a central role in U.S. policy and Burma’s political future. Many of the
U.S. sanctions on Burma were implemented after Burma’s ruling military
junta suppressed protests and detained many political prisoners. In
addition, the removal of many of the existing U.S. sanctions requires the release
of all political prisoners in Burma.
Similarly, hopes for a democratic government in Burma—as well as national
reconciliation— would depend on the release of prisoners associated with
the country’s ethnic groups. Several ethnic-based political parties have
stated they will not participate in parliamentary elections until their
members are released from custody. Also, prospects for stable ceasefires and
lasting peace with various ethnic-based militias may require the release
of their members currently in detention.
Estimates of how many political prisoners are being detained in Burma vary.
According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma),
or AAPP(B), a non-profit organization dedicated to identifying and
locating political prisoners in Burma, the Burmese government may be
holding over 100 political prisoners in its prisons and labor camps scattered
across the country.
Differences in the estimates of the number of political prisoners in Burma can
be attributed to two main factors. First, Burma’s prison and judicial
system is not transparent, making it difficult to obtain accurate
information. Second, there is no consensus on the definition of a “political prisoner.”
Some limit the definition of “political prisoner” to “prisoners of conscience”
(people who are detained for peaceful political opposition). The AAPP(B)
includes “anyone who is arrested because of his or her perceived or real
involvement in or supporting role in opposition movements with peaceful or
resistance means.”
Since his appointment in April 2011, President Thein Sein has granted amnesty
to selected prisoners on 12 separate occasions, the latest occurring on
October 8, 2013. In total, the Union Government has released 29,601
prisoners, of whom 1,002 were political prisoners, according to the
AAPP(B). During his July 2013 visit to the United Kingdom, President Thein Sein
pledged that all prisoners of conscience in Burma would be released by the
end of the year. However, critics claim that the Union Government
continues to arrest and detain new political prisoners, often for
violating new laws governing the right to peaceful assembly and protest.
The State Department is actively discussing the political prisoner issue—including
the definition of political prisoners—with the Burmese government,
opposition political parties, and representatives of some ethnic groups.
In these discussions, U.S. officials emphasize the importance of the
release of all political prisoners for the further easing or removal of U.S. sanctions
on Burma.
The status of Burma’s political prisoners is likely to figure prominently in
any congressional consideration of U.S. policy in Burma. Congress may
choose to examine the political prisoner issue in Burma either separately
or as part of a broader review of U.S. policy towards Burma. Congress may
also consider taking up legislation—on its own or in response to a request from
the Obama Administration—to amend, modify, or remove some of the existing
sanctions on Burma.
This report will be updated as circumstances require.
Date of Report: October 30, 2013
Number of Pages: 24
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