Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress

Ben Dolven
Specialist in Asian Affairs

Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs

Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs

Tensions surrounding numerous maritime territorial disputes in East Asia have become a pressing challenge for U.S. foreign policymakers. Beginning around 2005-2006, long-disputed waters in the South China Sea and, more recently, the East China Sea have become the site of increasingly aggressive behavior from nations trying to strengthen claims to disputed areas or to explore and develop offshore energy and fishery resources. Rising tensions in these waters raise a number of important issues for the 113th Congress.

The tensions have been fed by a series of aggressive actions by maritime authorities, including harassing vessels, destroying equipment, and blockading islets and shoals. The increasing frequency of such events raises the possibility of miscalculations that could lead to overt conflict at sea. It also poses complex questions about security and U.S. diplomacy in the region, and represents one of the most complicated challenges for the Obama Administration’s strategy of “rebalancing” foreign policy priorities towards the Asia-Pacific.

The territorial disputes at the heart of these tensions are decades old, and incidents between the parties to the disputes have been ongoing for many years.

• In the South China Sea, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) makes extensive claims, including marking on its maps an ambiguous “nine dash line” that covers most of the sea, including the Spratly and Paracel island groups. These claims overlap with those of four Southeast Asian nations—Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, which themselves have claims that conflict with each other. Taiwan also makes extensive claims mirroring those of the PRC. 
• In the East China Sea, China, Japan, and Taiwan each claim a Japan-administered island group that Japan calls the Senkakus, China the Diaoyu Islands, and Taiwan the Diaoyutai Islands. 
• Other territorial disputes exist between Japan and South Korea in the Sea of Japan, and between China and South Korea in the Yellow Sea. 

Although the United States has no territorial claim in these waters and does not take a position on the various specific territorial disputes, it does have treaty obligations with Japan and the Philippines that could be invoked if they become involved in an active conflict with another of the claimants. It is longstanding U.S. policy that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which stipulates that the United States is bound to protect Japan, covers the Senkaku islets, raising the prospect that the United States could become militarily involved in a Sino-Japanese conflict over the islets. The applicability of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to Philippine-claimed islands and waters in the South China Sea is less clear. This ambiguity presents a dilemma, in that the United States seeks to avoid being drawn into a potential conflict, but also seeks to support its treaty ally and deter a use of force against it.

The ability of the disputing countries, and of the United States and other parties, to manage tensions touches on numerous other U.S. interests including:

• protecting free and unimpeded commerce along some of the world’s busiest maritime trade routes; 
• maintaining peace and stability among maritime nations in the Asia-Pacific; 
• encouraging rules-based regional norms that discourage coercion or the use of force; 
• protecting the U.S. Navy’s ability to operate in these areas;
• managing U.S. treaty alliances with nations involved in the disputes; and 
• avoiding intimidation of U.S. companies which may seek to operate in the region. 

The 113th Congress may address East Asian maritime territorial disputes and the issues surrounding them in various ways. The Senate may consider offering its advice and consent on the United States becoming a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Congress may also choose to examine the economic and security implications of a greater U.S. military presence in disputed areas, or the merits of providing additional resources to Southeast Asian nations to monitor and police their maritime domains. It may choose to support efforts to lower tensions, including discussions between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on a Code of Conduct for parties in the South China Sea.

Date of Report: January 23, 2013
Number of Pages: 38
Order Number: R42930
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Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations

Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs

Since the mid-1990s, tensions have spiked periodically among Japan, China, and Taiwan over the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) islets in the East China Sea. These flare-ups run the risk of involving the United States in an armed conflict in the region. Japan administers the eight small, uninhabited islets, which some geologists believe sit near significant oil and natural gas deposits. China and Taiwan both contest Japanese claims of sovereignty over the islets.

U.S. administrations going back at least to the Nixon Administration have stated that the United States takes no position on the territorial disputes. However, it also has been U.S. policy since 1972 that the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the islets, because Article 5 of the treaty stipulates that the United States is bound to protect “the territories under the Administration of Japan” and Japan administers the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands). Under the treaty, the United States guarantees Japan’s security in return for the right to station U.S. troops—which currently number around 50,000—in dozens of bases throughout the Japanese archipelago. Although it is commonly understood that Japan will assume the primary responsibility for the defense of the treaty area, in the event of a significant armed conflict with either China or Taiwan, most Japanese would likely expect that the United States would honor its treaty obligations.

Each time tensions over the islets have flared, questions have arisen concerning the U.S. legal relationship to the islets. This report will focus on that issue, which has four elements:

1. U.S. administration of the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands) from 1953 to 1971; 
2. the application to the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands) of the 1971 “Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands”—commonly known as the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, approved by the Senate in 1971 and entered into force the following year (the Daito Islands lie to the east of Okinawa); 
3. the U.S. view on the claims of the disputants; and 
4. the relationship of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to the islets. 

Members of Congress periodically have been involved or expressed interest in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) dispute over the decades, most prominently when the issue of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty’s application arose during the Senate’s deliberations over the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. In 2012, congressional committees explored the topic in hearings and inserted in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310/P.L. 112-239) a resolution stating, among other items, that “the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the United States’ acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands.” Similarly, in January 2013, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated that “we oppose any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration” of the islets. This language was a reaction to China’s increase in patrols around the Senkakus since the fall of 2012, moves that appear to many to be an attempt to exploit the U.S. distinction between sovereignty and administrative control by demonstrating that Beijing has a degree of administrative control over the islets.


Date of Report: January 22, 2013
Number of Pages: 10
Order Number: R42761
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U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues

K. Alan Kronstadt
Specialist in South Asian Affairs

Sonia Pinto
Research Associate

In today’s fluid geopolitical environment, the relationship between the United States, the world’s oldest democracy and an established global power, and India, its most populous democracy and an aspiring global power, is seen as a key variable in the unfolding international dynamics of the 21st century. As U.S. foreign policy attention shifts toward the Asia-Pacific (or Indo-Pacific) region, and as India’s economic and military capabilities grow, Washington’s pursuit of a strategic partnership with New Delhi demonstrates that the mutual wariness of the Cold War era has rapidly faded. A vital and in some ways leading aspect of this partnership has been security relations, and today the two countries are engaging in unprecedented levels of military-to-military ties, defense trade, and counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation. Still, although considerable enthusiasm for deepened security engagement is found in both capitals—and not least in the U.S. Congress—there is also a persistent sense that this aspect of the bilateral relationship lacks purpose and focus. Some observers arrgue that the potential of the relationship has been oversold, and that the benefits either hoped for or expected may not materialize in the near future. While Obama Administration officials variously contend that India is now or will be a net provider of security in its region, many independent analysts are skeptical that this aspiration can be realized, at least in the near-term.

Nongovernmental analyses of the course and pace of U.S.-India security relations are oftentimes incompatible or even conflicting in their assumptions and recommendations. Such incompatibility is frequently the result of the differing conclusions rooted in short-term versus long-term perspectives. The Obama Administration—along with numerous pro-India analysts in Washington—has tended to emphasize the anticipated benefits of long-term engagement as opposed to a short-term approach that seeks gains derived through more narrow transactions. This latter tack can have the effect of raising and then thwarting expectations in Washington, as was the case with the ultimate failure of U.S. defense firms to secure the multi-billion-dollar contracts to supply new combat aircraft to India. At the same time, frustrations among many in the United States have arisen from the sense that India’s enthusiasm for further deepening bilateral security cooperation is limited, and that New Delhi’s reciprocity has been insufficient.

Looking ahead, there is widespread concurrence among many officials and analysts that the security relationship would benefit from undergirding ambitious rhetoric with more concrete action in areas of mutual agreement. In their view, defining which actions will provide meaningful gains, even on a modest scale, appears to be the central task facing U.S. and Indian policy makers in coming years.

To assist Members of Congress and their staffs in clarifying the status of and outlook for bilateral security cooperation, this report—a companion to CRS Report R42823, India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement, by K. Alan Kronstadt and Sonia Pinto—takes a systematic approach to the major strategic perspectives held by policy makers in both countries and the ways in which these perspectives are variously harmonious, discordant, or, in some cases, both. The report opens with a brief review of the pre-2005 history of U.S.-India security relations. This is followed by discussion of key U.S. security interests related to India. Next is a focus on India’s defense posture writ large. With this context set, the report reviews key areas of convergent and divergent security interests and perspectives. A brief discussion of the outlook for future security cooperation closes. For information on U.S.-India relations more broadly, see CRS Report RL33529, India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations , coordinated by K. Alan Kronstadt.


Date of Report: January 24, 2013
Number of Pages: 56
Order Number: R42948
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U.S. Sanctions on Burma: Issues for the 113th Congress

Michael F. Martin
Specialist Asian Affairs

Since December 2011, the Obama Administration has waived many of the existing sanctions specifically imposed on Burma in an effort to promote greater political and economic reform in the country. Having waived most of the sanctions for which he had the authority to do so, President Obama may approach the 113th Congress about the selective repeal or removal of one or more of the current sanctions on Burma. In addition, the 113th Congress may consider either the imposition of additional sanctions or the removal of some of the existing sanctions on Burma, depending on the conduct of the Burmese government and other developments in the country.

Existing U.S. sanctions on Burma are based on various U.S. laws and presidential executive orders. This report provides a brief history of U.S. policy towards Burma and the development of U.S. sanctions, a topical summary of those sanctions, and an overview of actions taken to waive or ease those sanctions by the Obama Administration. The report concludes with a discussion of actions taken by the 112th Congress and options for 113th Congress.

Current U.S. sanctions on Burma can be generally divided into several broad categories, such as visa bans, restrictions on financial services, prohibitions of Burmese imported goods, a ban on new investments in Burma, and constraints on U.S. assistance to Burma.

The current U.S. sanctions on Burma were enacted, for the most part, due to what the U.S. government saw as a general disregard by Burma’s ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), for the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Burma. Burma-specific sanctions began following the Burmese military’s violent suppression of popular protests in 1988, and have continued through several subsequent periods in which Congress perceived major human rights violations in Burma. The result is a web of overlapping sanctions with differing restrictions, waiver provisions, expiration conditions, and reporting requirements.

In addition to the targeted sanctions, Burma is currently subject to certain sanctions specified in U.S. laws addressing various functional issues. In many cases, the type of assistance or relations restricted or prohibited by these provisions is also addressed under Burma-specific sanction laws. The functional issues include the use of child soldiers, drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, failure to protect religious freedoms, violations of workers’ rights, and threats to world peace and the security of the United States.

On March 30, 2011, the SPDC formally dissolved itself and transferred power to a nominally civilian government known as the Union Government, headed by President Thein Sein, exgeneral and former prime minister for the SPDC. President Thein Sein, with the support of Burma’s Union Parliament, has implemented a number of political and economic reforms, to which the Obama Administration has responded by waiving or easing sanctions. However, the continuation of serious human rights abuses has raised questions about the extent to which there has been significant political change in Burma, and if the easing of sanctions has been warranted.


Date of Report: January 11, 2013
Number of Pages: 44
Order Number: R42939
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